Archive for March, 2011
How To Outsmart Your Attorney and Save Money On Your Bill!

TALK IS CHEAP…UNLESS YOU’RE TALKING TO A LAWYER!
A penny saved is a penny earned. More than two-hundred years have passed since Benjamin Franklin uttered this famous phrase, yet the words still ring true today. Perhaps this explains why we search high and low to find the loan with the lowest interest rate, the realtor with the smallest commission structure and the bank with the fewest fees.
The need to wisely save (and wisely spend) money is never more true than in tough economic times. Ironically, it is in tough economic times when we find ourselves having to spend money where we wish we did not — on legal help.
Most attorneys, myself included, spend a lot of time explaining “the law†to clients who are seeking advice, but very few of my colleagues spend any time explaining how the client can avoid paying unnecessary attorney’s fees and costs over the course of their representation.
I’ve compiled ten money-saving techniques in this book to help teach potential clients where to look for money-saving opportunities within their own attorney-client relationship. By putting these techniques into practice, those in need of legal representation may easily save hundreds, and possibly thousands, in unnecessary legal fees and costs.
The principles contained in How to Outsmart Your Attorney and Save Money on Your Bill can be applied to virtually any attorney-client relationship, be it business, civil, personal injury, corporate law, contract negotiation, matrimonial and family law, or criminal defense — you name it. Even those litigants who hire one of those lawyers who promise, “If We Don’t Win, You Don’t Pay!†can benefit from the skills to be learned in this book because, what those lawyers don’t tell you, is that you, the client, WILL PAY costs – not fees – even if you and your lawyer lose the case! To the unsuspecting client, costs can really add up. Until now, that is.
Most attorneys charge upward of $250 per hour for their time (double that if your lawyer is located in a big city, and triple it if your big-city lawyer never met a camera she didn’t like) If my readers use any of the techniques to shave as little as one hour of attorney time off their bills, this book will pay for itself several times over!
No matter how rich or poor a person may be, legal representation can be both exceptionally good and affordable. There is no need to compromise one for the other. I hope attorneys and their prospective clients alike will benefit from the techniques contained in this book.
Virginia Second Offense Guilty Operators License Administratively Suspended DUI Lawyers Attorneys
JAMES EASTER, S/K/A JAMES L. EASTER v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
March 7, 2000, Decided
On June 2, 1998, Appellant was arrested for DUI. Appellant’s operator’s license was administratively suspended for seven days, pursuant to Code § 46.2-391.2. In general district court, although the Commonwealth had evidence of sufficient convictions to amend the charge to a third offense, it agreed to amend the warrant to DUI, second offense, in exchange for a guilty plea. Appellant pled guilty to, and the court convicted him of, DUI, second offense. Appellant later noted his appeal to the circuit court. In circuit court, the court amended the charge to DUI, third offense, over appellant’s objection that the amendment violated his double jeopardy and due process rights. Appellant appealed his conviction for drunk driving from the Circuit Court of Lunenburg County (Virginia), asserting double jeopardy for an improper license suspension under Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-391.2(C), and improper amendment of the warrant to third offense on de novo appeal in the circuit court.
Issues:
Whether the administrative suspension was improper and penal in nature?
Whether the trial court erred in allowing the Commonwealth to amend the warrant to charge DUI?
Discussion:
Here, the general district court did not acquit appellant of any offense. Acceptance of a guilty plea to a lesser-included offense does not constitute an acquittal of a greater offense. The administrative suspension is civil and remedial, not penal, in nature, for double jeopardy purposes. Appellant avoided prosecution for the greater offense by pleading guilty to a lesser offense, pursuant to a plea agreement. He then breached that agreement by appealing the conviction. Where a appellant pleads guilty pursuant to a plea agreement and receives the agreed upon sentence, an implied term of the agreement is that the appellant will not appeal what he has bargained for and received.” Jeopardy did not attach because he did not stand trial for and was not acquitted of DUI, third offense. He did not suffer prosecution after acquittal and, therefore, his double jeopardy rights were not violated. When appellant appealed to the circuit court, he placed himself in the same position as he was prior to the plea agreement in the general district court. Appellant stipulated that the Commonwealth intended to amend the warrant to charge DUI, third offense, in the general district court. By appealing the lower court conviction, appellant found himself without the benefit of his bargain, without acquittal on any greater offense, and with the possibility and reality of being tried for the greater offense of DUI, third offense. Amending the warrant did not violate appellant’s due process rights.
This Court affirmed the conviction of driving under the influence, third offense.
Disclaimer:
These summaries are provided by the SRIS Law Group. They represent the firm’s unofficial views of the Justices’ opinions. The original opinions should be consulted for their authoritative content
Originally published here.
Atchuthan Sriskandarajah
